Spinoza’s dual View on human Freedom by Fridl, Miroslav
41Revista Conatus - FilosoFia de spinoza - volume 10 - númeRo 19 - Julho 2018
IntroductIon
In history of philosophy, Spinoza is well known as radical determinist. According to that determinism, every thing that exists and 
acts does it in only one possible way determined 
from eternity. This doctrine provoked severe 
criticism addressed to Spinoza because it 
clearly jeopardized traditional understanding 
of freedom as capability of choice.1 Opposition 
of many critics Spinoza could not attenuate 
by offering his concept of freedom: action 
determined by proper nature. However, didn’t 
Spinoza, with his philosophy, called for exactly 
that traditional concept of freedom officially 
and explicitly denied by him?
 I’ll show, in my article, that Spinoza 
promotes both concepts of freedom: official and 
unofficial one. The official concept follows from 
his ontological and anthropological premises; 
the unofficial one is required and implied by the 
prescriptiveness of his ethics. Although it was 
much discussed about whether Spinoza teaches 
ethical descriptiveness or prescriptiveness, I’ll 
show that he certainly teaches, implicitly at least, 
prescriptiveness.
 Actually, Spinoza promotes dual strategy: 
on objective-ontological level, man can be free only 
in sense of Spinoza’s official concept of freedom; 
on subjective-practical level, Spinoza promotes 
freedom (CC). It is interesting to note that he uses 
the same strategy regarding issue that was probably 
the most important in whole his philosophy: man’s 
activity. Regardless of his insisting that God is the 
only source of all activity in reality, he ascribes to 
man too, implicitly, the power of acting. His ethical 
prescriptiveness calls for man’s activity too.
1 For this traditional understanding of freedom, I’ll use 
the shorter expression: freedom (CC), where “CC” stands 
for „Capability of Choice“.
1. SpInoza’S offIcIal concept of freedom
 In order to understand what, according 
Spinoza, consists man’s freedom in, we must first 
see the basic ontological and anthropological 
premises which offer us an answer to question 
what human freedom could be anyway. Among 
those premises there are certainly determinism, 
deanthropomorfized God and substance monism.
 Substance monism and determinism 
represent two basic features of Spinoza’s 
ontology. While substance monism determines 
ontological status of every thing, determinism 
shows in which way every thing, including man, 
acts. These two aspects are, of course, deeply 
intertwined and must be always taken together. 
According to substance monism, God is the 
unique substance or reality and all other things, 
including man, are solely particular expressions 
or modes of that reality under different attributes.
 When building his determinism, Spinoza 
particularly took as ideal mathematics as it 
was presented in Euclid’s Elements. Whole 
mathematical system was developed in manner 
that definitions, postulates and axioms were 
taken as basic starting points from which 
there were deduced, through strict deduction, 
theorems and propositions. There holds, in 
whole this construction, strict deductiveness 
which assures to deduced propositions the same 
certainty that basic premises have. It seems 
that determinism assures, on ontological level, 
such a deductiveness and certainty of the whole 
system: from the actual constitution of reality 
it is possible only one future constitution. The 
world, as we know it, was determined from 
eternity to be now exactly in way it actually is 
and it will be in the future exactly in one possible 
way because Spinoza’s God doesn’t have intellect 
and freedom for evaluating different possible 
worlds and then choosing one of them. It was 
traditional understanding that all things are not 
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strictly determined in their being and acting, 
that is, God and man have capability of acting in 
this or that way. Spinoza’s explicit and resolute 
reaction is: No! He offers his concept of divine 
and human freedom taking into account basic 
ontological premises as exposed in the first part 
of Ethics.
 Spinoza defines free and constrained 
thing as follows: 
That thing is said to be free [liber] which 
exists solely from the necessity of its own 
nature, and is determined to action by 
itself alone. A thing is said to be necessary 
[necessarius] or rather, constrained [coactus], 
if it is determined by another thing to exist 
and to act in a definite and determinate way 
(E1Def7). 
Spinoza in both definitions says that a thing 
is “determined” (determinatur) to exist and 
to act, which means that determination or 
determinedness is not a property by which 
constrained thing differs from the free one. 
Essential difference is in the fact whether a thing 
is determined by itself or some external thing. In 
first case, a thing is free; in second case, a thing 
is not free.
 It is obviously that the first definition 
refers exclusively to God since solely God exists 
by necessity of his nature and is by his nature 
determined to act. It cannot be otherwise since he 
is the only one substance, that is, there is, outside 
God, no other thing with which he would be in 
interaction and which could affect him or act 
with him co-causally. So, God is – in his acting 
– determined solely by his nature and in that 
fact lays excellence and fullness of his freedom: 
“God acts solely from the laws of his own nature, 
constrained by none” (E1P17); or, “God alone is a 
free cause” (E1P17C2). We can see that Spinoza 
in no way conceives freedom in libertarian sense 
of nonexistence of determinedness but put the 
accent on being determined by proper nature. 
The source of all determinedness is God’s essence 
(cf. E1P17Dm,C1,C2 and S; E1P29Dm).
 What about human freedom? Spinoza 
first, in the first sentence of Preface of the fifth 
part of Ethics promises us “the method or way 
leading to freedom” while he previously stated 
that only God was free because he is the only 
one who acts solely by his nature. Man is, on the 
other hand, only one little part of Nature and is 
always, because of interaction with other little 
parts, subjected to passive emotions or passions 
and must obey the general order of Nature (cf. 
E4P4C). If man is subjected to passions, he is 
not free but is slave: “I assign the term ‘bondage’ 
to man’s lack of power to control and check the 
emotions” (E4Praef). When man is subjected to 
passions, his effects are more or less explained 
through other, external causes and not only by 
his nature (cf. E4P5Dm). Even more, for people 
who think to posses free will and to be able to 
act through their free decisions he says: 
So these mental decisions arise in the mind 
from the same necessity as the ideas of 
things existing in actuality, and those who 
believe that they speak, or keep silent, or do 
anything from the free mental decision are 
dreaming with their eyes open (E1P17C2).
 Why, then, Spinoza, and in which sense, 
promises the way that leads to freedom if such 
a freedom is unavailable from beginning? 
Obviously, we should conceive human freedom 
as gradual (cf. E4P73Dm). It means that man 
is as more free as his acts are more caused and 
explicable solely by his nature (because they arise 
from his nature; cf. E1Def1). However, when it 
is about freedom in a sense of determinedness 
by proper nature Spinoza stresses something 
more: if, before Spinoza, it was usually said that 
freedom was cause that moved to specific action 
although intellect had found out that something 
else should have been done, Spinoza promotes 
essentially different, intellectualistic, conception.
 First of all, he makes it clear that will 
is mere thought construct, something abstract 
that does not exist in reality but arises by 
generalization of volitions which really exist, 
in the same way as the intellect is actually 
constructed by generalization of particular ideas 
which intellect has (cf. E2P48S). It doesn’t mean 
that Spinoza eliminates completely the word 
“will” but he explicates its precise meaning:
by the will I mean the faculty of affirming 
and denying, and not desire. I mean, I 
repeat, the faculty whereby the mind 
affirms or denies what is true or what is 
false, not the desire whereby the mind 
seeks things or shuns them (ibid)
 If we still use concept “will”, we must 
understand by it particular volitions, “this or that 
affirmation or this or that negation” (E2P49Dm). 
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Spinoza says that affirmation or negation is not 
possible without what is affirmed or negated 
(cf. ibid). Idea and its affirmation/negation 
is actually so close and interdependent that 
Spinoza concludes that every volition is “nothing 
but idea” (ibid), or, “will and intellect are one 
and the same thing” (E2P49C). Identity of will 
and intellect should be seen on basis of deeper 
identity of mind and body which are “one and the 
same thing, conceived now under the attribute of 
Thought, now under the attribute of Extension” 
(E3P2S). This means that between order and 
linking of mind’s actions/passions there exists 
strict parallelism with order and linking of 
body’s actions/passions. In another words, 
Spinoza identify mind’s appetite/decision with 
body’s disposition (cf. ibid). Body’s disposition 
depends on how it is affected by external bodies, 
and specific affections are manifested in mind 
as specific ideas.2 External things ordinarily 
affect the mind, but Spinoza thinks the mind 
has power in determining the whole man’s 
behavior, that is, man – through intellect – can 
gain interactions with external things in which he 
is less dependent. Intellectualistic identification 
of mind and will enables Spinoza to bind man’s 
freedom essentially with knowledge: “A passive 
emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon 
as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (E5P3). 
Both freedom and knowledge have one common 
feature: self-determination. Self-determination 
implies, per se, power of acting or activity because 
man performs, in that case, acts that at greater 
length arise from his nature, that is, they are 
determined by his nature.3 The categories of 
freedom, knowledge and activity are closely 
intertwined. 
 So, when it is about freedom, what is 
unavoidable is intellect: “A free man, that is, 
he who lives solely according to the dictates 
of reason” (E4P67Dm); or, a free man “tries to 
2 M. Kisner nicely describes relationship mind-proper 
body-external bodies as follows: “human beings, 
understood at the most basic level, are collections of 
finite modes, which are determined by other finite modes. 
More specifically, our minds are collections of ideas, 
representing a particular body, which is determined by 
its interactions with other bodies”. (KISNER, Matthew. 
Spinoza on Human Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, p. 232).
3 Cf. KISNER, Matthew. Spinoza on…, op. cit., pp. 80 
and 165.
guide himself and others by the free judgement of 
reason and to do only those things that he himself 
knows to be of primary importance” (E4P70Dm). 
So, without knowledge there is neither freedom, 
that is, freedom essentially depends on reason’s 
power, and this fact is testified by the title of 
the fifth part of Ethics. The crucial question 
is: why would freedom be proportional to the 
reason’s power? Or, how knowledge can change 
or attenuate passions which a man is subjected 
to and which make him live in bondage? Isn’t 
knowledge only one of man’s capabilities that 
serves for evaluating different options – whether 
he will live by dictate of passions or by dictate 
of reason – while the will is capability thanks to 
which a man can chose this or that life style?   
 First of all, man should adequately know 
his passions in their true nature and in context of 
the whole reality, because passion is not passion 
any more as soon as we form clear and distinct 
idea thereof; or, true knowledge is best remedy 
for passions: “since the power of mind is defined 
solely by the understanding… we shall determine 
solely by the knowledge of the mind the 
remedies for the emotions” (E5Praef). Spinoza, 
at the beginning of the fifth part of Ethics offers 
different remedies for the emotions, but we could 
say that man confronts these emotions only “from 
outside”, that is, emotions are only attenuated 
in their strength. “Direct” confrontation with 
passive emotions takes place only after they are 
attenuated and this confrontation is possible 
because the knowledge itself is a kind of emotion: 
“An emotion cannot be checked or destroyed 
except by a contrary emotion which is stronger 
than the emotion which is to be checked” (E4P7). 
We should recall that emotions are “affections of 
the body by which the body’s power of activity 
is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, 
together with the ideas of these affections” 
(E3Def3). Body’s affection can vary, depending 
on natures of external bodies that affect it and 
on man’s corporeal-spiritual constitution itself. 
So, emotion implies not only specific affection 
of body but idea of it as well. Interaction with 
external world is manifested in this emotion and 
this emotion can be twofold: action and passion.
 In short, freedom means man’s condition 
in which he is less subjected to the influence 
of external things and is in greater part cause 
of his acts. To achieve such a condition, man 
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has knowledge on disposition. This helps him 
attenuate passions through which he manifests 
dependency on external things. Knowledge is, by 
itself, emotion or arises emotion and emotions 
are those that determine man to act in this or 
that way. True knowledge not only gives to man 
the greatest pleasure but manifests the greatest 
man’s perfection, and perfection implies the 
power of action. True knowledge can, as emotion 
that moves to action, destroy some bad emotion 
and here we can see the intellectualistic aspect 
of Spinoza’s ethics. If such a knowledge enables 
man to live more actively, that is, determined 
by his nature, than it is deeply connected with 
freedom which is exactly acting by own nature.
 This is Spinoza’s official concept of 
freedom which differs essentially from traditional 
concept of freedom (CC). However, did Spinoza 
completely rejected the concept of freedom (CC) 
or is it perhaps implicit in spinozism? More over, 
doesn’t Spinoza need exactly freedom (CC) and 
doesn’t he promote it implicitly? To be able to 
give answers to these questions, we must see 
first whether Spinoza teaches, in his ethics, 
descriptiveness of prescriptiveness.
2. deScrIptIVeneSS/preScrIptIVeneSS of SpInoza’S 
ethIcS
 We can adduce two pillars on which 
Spinoza builds prescriptiveness of his ethics: 
“dictates of reason” and “model of human 
nature”. He opens and mainly keep writing 
his main work using sober and non-partial 
language trying to persuade his readers that 
things are exactly the way he describes they 
are. In that sense, we can and must talk about 
descriptiveness. This is how things are: there 
is only one substance which acts in a way 
strictly determined by its nature; every other 
thing is a mode that expresses the activity of 
divine substance; man is one of these modes 
expressed through mind and body between 
which there is conceptual and causal barrier; 
man endeavors to keep in his being and to 
increase his power of action; man’s emotions 
a essentially co-determined by external causes 
with which man is in perpetual interaction; if in 
man there are two or more opposite emotions, 
the stronger will prevail; man seeks goods 
which are projected by his actual constitution, 
etc. However, this descriptive way of teaching 
steps back at moment in which Spinoza starts 
to talk about what man “should” do, as different 
to what he does in fact.
a) Dictates of reason
 Dictates of reason have eminent place and 
role because
since reason demands nothing contrary to 
nature, it therefore demands that every 
man himself should seek his own advantage 
(I mean his real advantage), should aim at 
whatever really leads a man toward greater 
perfection (E4P18S). 
Let’s recall some concrete dictates of 
reason. Spinoza invites us to recompense other’s 
hatred with love (cf. E4P46) although we are 
willing to recompense other’s hatred with 
hatred and revenge. Hatred is itself pain, and 
this pain means transition to lower perfection. 
Then, dictates of reason have important function 
because man can, through them, refuse present 
lesser good for greater future good (cf. E4P26 
and 66). Then, if we act according to the dictates 
of reason, we shall seek for understanding 
through which we affirm the essence of our 
mind (cf. E4P26 and Dm). Important segment of 
Spinoza’s philosophy was the quality of people’s 
coexistence in community. People will live in 
concordance only if they seek for that what is 
common to them, that is, if they act from the 
laws of their nature, where dictates of reason 
offer important directions (cf. E4P35Dm and C; 
E4P73Dm; E4P40Dm). Then, life by the guidance 
of reason opens the door for sort of altruism, 
since “He who lives by the guidance of reason 
desires for another, too, the good that he seeks 
for himself” (E4P51Dm2). Let’s see now some 
important implications of Spinoza’s speech of 
reason’s dictates.
 First, Spinoza accomplishes, through 
them, de-subjectivization or objectivization of 
goods. When Spinoza speaks of “good”, he firstly 
explicates and describes it in purely subjectivist 
meaning insofar as 
we do not desire a thing because we judge 
it to be good; on the contrary, we call the 
object of our desire good, and consequently 
the object of our aversion bad. Therefore, 
it is according to his emotion that everyone 
judges or deems what is good, bad, better, 
worse, best, or worst (E3P39S)    
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There is no mention here of some “objective” 
criterion according to which we should all be 
obliged to follow some “objective” good. In the 
same manner, if before Spinoza God was conceived 
as the ultime authority who has right to prescribe 
objective goods that all men, as God’s creatures, 
had to follow, then such an argumentation doesn’t 
take place in spinozism: Spinoza’s God is not 
personal creator of universe who gives to men 
commandments how they should behavior. The 
state possibly can proscribe some general norms 
of citizens’ behavior but these norms don’t cover 
many cases when men have to evaluate what is 
good and to act accordingly. Besides, in a case of 
citizen laws, it is supposed that citizens are enough 
enlightened to be able to understand that these 
laws are really useful to them and not something 
imposed from outside.
 So, when Spinoza addresses “good” in 
purely descriptive way, he only describes how 
man finds what he conceives or puts as good, 
that is, on basis of his fortuitous emotions (cf. 
E3P51S). The consequence of such a subjectivist 
consideration of good and tendency to achieve 
them is not something that can truly make men 
happy because in that case 
“we are in many respects at the mercy of external 
causes and are tossed about like the waves of the 
sea when driven by contrary winds, unsure of the 
outcome and of our fate” (E3P59S)
 No matter how much it is not pleasant to 
watch other people in their pathetic condition 
of being “tossed about like the waves”, it 
was certainly more problematic for Spinoza 
another consequence of man’s acting when 
he is guided by subjectivist good: discord and 
hostility among men. Namely, insofar as men 
act according to their passive emotions “they 
can be different in nature… and contrary to one 
another” (E4P35Dm). From such diversity and 
confrontation arise emotions like hatred, anger, 
envy etc., as well as the tendency of many men 
toward some competitive good. Therefore it is 
not surprising that Spinoza, although in Preface 
of the fourth part of Ethics still says that good 
and bad
indicate nothing positive in things 
considered in themselves, and are nothing 
but modes of thinking, or notions which 
we form from comparing things with one 
another. For one and the same thing can at 
the same tame be good and bad, and also 
different,
he very soon offers qualitatively different 
definition of “good” and “bad”:
By good I understand that which we 
certainly know to be useful to us” and “By 
bad I understand that which we certainly 
know to be an obstacle to our attainment 
of some good (E4Def1 and 2)
 Importance and value of dictates of reason 
lay in fact that we, through them, know that 
something is really useful to us. What is really 
useful to us? That what truly affirm our nature. 
In that sense, acting by dictates of reason has 
universal value and contributes to harmonious 
coexistence because
insofar as men live under the guidance of 
reason, to that extent only do they necessarily 
do the things which are necessarily good for 
human nature and consequently for every 
single man; that is … which agree with the 
nature of every single man. So men also are 
necessarily in agreement insofar as they live 
under the guidance of reason (E4P35Dm)
 No matter how much Spinoza is unclear 
about human nature, it is clear from aforesaid 
that his idea was that all men have the same 
nature, under the condition that this nature be 
understood in its deepest core which we affirm 
when we act under the guidance of reason. In 
that we should see universality of those dictates 
insofar as they help every man in realizing what 
is truly good for him. Spinoza made, in that way, 
important step toward de-subjectivization of 
“good” and thereby of ethical behavior although 
he probably jeopardized mechanism of mere 
“projection” of “goods” from the actual man’s 
constitution or affection.
 Then, it is introduced, through dictates of 
reason, some sort of normativity. If objectivity 
is gained by stressing the common element of 
human nature which we affirm when realizing 
goods explicated by reason, normativity is 
achieved by stressing the fact that only true 
good assures self-preservation and increasing 
of power. Objectivity and normativity are, of 
course, deeply intertwined insofar as normativity 
justifies objectivity to be stressed.
 Man’s basic striving consists in self-
preservation and increasing of power of action. 
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Both things man can realize in two basic ways: 
following apparent good or following true good. 
In first case, if he gains desired good (wealth, 
honor, sensual pleasure), it is about apparent 
happiness because the thing man is connected 
with is itself imperfect and shaking. In such 
a situation, man is slave of fate and those 
scenarios that fate brings to him. In a case of 
true good (knowledge of God and ourselves), 
man’s happiness can only be increased and in 
no way can it vanishes because the thing man is 
connected with and opened to (God or Nature) 
is, by itself, perfect and unshakable. 
 Since these two goods (and behaviors 
arising from tendency toward one or another) 
manifest essential difference between them, 
there is also essential difference between ways 
how man realizes his conatus perseverandi. 
Granted that reader of Spinoza’s philosophy is 
persuaded of validity of Spinoza’s arguments 
and conclusions, it is reasonable to expect that 
he will also accept and realize them because we 
can suppose that every reasonable man can’t be 
indifferent regarding the way how to realize 
his conatus. So, if I know that knowledge of 
God and myself in context of the whole Nature 
will help me to gain the highest happiness and 
perfection, then such truly good is binding for 
me like a norm I have to follow. Normativity 
of reason’s dictates and superiority of goods 
those dictates direct to consist, therefore, in 
qualitative superiority of true goods in face 
of apparent goods which man tends to with 
his inadequate knowledge. We can talk about 
normativity on basis of distinction between 
“untrue” knowledge of good and bad, based 
on subjective perception (cf. E4P8) and “true” 
knowledge of good and bad (cf. E4P14). In such 
a context it is, of course, of crucial importance 
whether Spinoza offered good and persuasive 
enough arguments why we should call some 
good “true” instead of “untrue” or “apparent”. 
It is, therefore, one of the most important issue 
whether a reader has accepted his statement 
that “the essence of reason is nothing other 
than our mind insofar as it clearly and distinctly 
understands” (E4P26Dm), which means that 
mind will preserve his being best and most 
efficaciously if understands as more and distinct 
as possible and not by abandoning itself to 
sensual pleasures and inadequate knowledge.
 Spinoza’s try to construct his ethics in 
objectivizing and prescriptive light we can also 
find in his statements about “model of human 
nature”:
So in what follows I shall mean by ‘good’ that 
which we certainly know to be the means 
of our approaching nearer to the model of 
human nature that we set before ourselves, 
and by ‘bad’ that which we certainly know 
prevents us from reproducing the said 
model. Again, we shall say that men are 
more perfect or less perfect insofar as they 
are nearer to or farther from this model 
(E4Praef)
 This “model of human nature” refers, 
first of all, to “free man” who Spinoza describes 
in many places. Particularity of free man comes 
forward if we compare him with slave: slave “is 
guided only by emotion or belief”, while free 
man is “guided by reason” (E4P66S). Or, slave 
“whether he will or not, performs actions of 
which he is completely ignorant”, while free man 
“does no one’s will but his own, and does only 
what he knows to be of greatest importance in 
life, which he therefore desires above all” (ibid). 
But, particularity of spinozistic freedom consists 
above all in being caused by proper nature and 
not by external causes. Unapproachable model 
of freedom is God, but Spinoza invites man 
to achieve as much as possible higher level of 
freedom because in that case he will be not tossed 
like wave of the sea.
 Life in freedom manifest other advantages 
too: free man has no fear of death (cf. E4P67); 
he knows, in concrete situations, how to find out 
the right action (cf. E4P69C); he will bind himself 
with other free man through true friendship 
(cf. E4P71Dm and S); free man is veracious (cf. 
E4P72); free men live harmoniously in society 
(cr. E4P73Dm); besides, Spinoza equates our 
freedom with our salvation or blessedness: 
From this we clearly understand in what our 
salvation or blessedness or freedom consists, 
namely, in the constant and eternal love 
toward God, that is, in God’s love toward 
men (E5P36S).
 If reader is not convinced completely by 
those Spinoza’s arguments of why he should act 
according to the reason’s dictates, Spinoza has 
another trump card: wise man. The wise man 
can function as model of human nature insofar 
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as he manifests the life style by which should be 
attracted every reasonable man who truly wants 
to preserve in being and increase his power of 
action. Spinoza is not proponent of any sort of 
asceticism but he promotes modesty in all body’s 
activities and pleasures. The body must be so 
disposed as to be able to be affected by as great 
pleasure as possible, because that’s the only 
way of our passing to greater perfection and 
our greater participation in divine nature, while 
our mind being readier for understanding many 
things (cf. E4P45S2). Therefore, wise man is not 
an ascetic but prudent and moderate hedonist:
It is, I repeat, the part of a wise man to 
refresh and invigorate himself in moderation 
with good food and drink, as also with 
perfumes, with the beauty of blossoming 
plants, with dress, music, sporting activities, 
theaters, and the like, in which every man 
can indulge without harm to another (ibid)
 Besides, a wise man manifests one nobler 
life style. Namely, the whole Spinoza’s ethical 
project is about helping people to – by use of 
adequate knowledge – leave their slavery and 
enter the condition of freedom in which reason’s 
power steps forward. While ignorant, because of 
his inadequate knowledge, is being tossed like 
wave and because of that he cannot gain the true 
satisfaction of mind, 
the wise man, insofar as he is considered 
as such, suffers scarcely any disturbance 
of spirit, but being conscious, by virtue of 
a certain eternal necessity, of himself, of 
God and of things, never ceases to be, but 
always possesses true spiritual contentment 
(E5P42S).
 To make conclusion, “reason’s dictates” 
and “model of human nature” have a common 
element which is, by itself, very important for 
every man: they are connected with behavior’s 
model which is superior to merely subjectivist-
relativistic model based exclusively on subjective 
evaluation of a man what is useful to him or isn’t. 
This “objectivistic” model is the only one that 
makes it possible for man to proceed in freedom, 
happiness, activity, virtue etc., and offers the best 
realization of man’s conatus perseverandi and his 
tendency to increase his power. It also brings, to 
that extent, obligation to be accepted and applied 
in practice. But, does it suffice for conclusion that 
Spinoza’s ethics is prescriptive indeed?
 The fact that Spinoza, through his 
determinism, teaches the man’s basic passivity 
regarding what happens with him and around 
him and, on the other side, the fact that he still 
invites man to take his destiny in his hands 
and to adjust his behavior to objectivist model 
result with different interpretations regarding 
compatibility of his ethics’ prescriptiveness and 
determinism (but other elements too). And so 
we have commentators who consider Spinoza 
consequent in his descriptive account of ethics as 
well as those who think that Spinoza promotes 
some sort of prescriptiveness or, at least, shows 
tendency toward it. It seems that this second 
group is bigger. Rightly!
 Among the former, I’ll sort out D. Garrett.4 
Garrett thinks, in principle, that Spinoza, 
although in the title of his master piece says 
that he wants to demonstrate ethics, he doesn’t 
do it because ethics is a prescriptive discipline 
and Spinoza’s axioms and definitions are, by 
themselves, descriptive.5 He also rightly notes 
that in Ethics there are almost completely 
missing words like “should”, “must”, “may” etc. 
Then, in spinozism we can easily find the use of 
words “good” and “bad” in purely subjectivist 
meaning like, for example, when he says that “it 
is by the sovereign natural right that every man 
judges what is good and what is bad, and has 
regard for his own advantage according to his 
own way of thinking” (E4P37S2). Then, some 
main ethical categories often have non-ethical 
meaning.6 Spinoza so defines “good” as that 
what is useful or what brings to self-preservation; 
“virtue” is man’s power (cf. E4P20Dm), and man 
is more virtuous as he tries and succeeds in self-
preservation (cf. E4P20); “free” man is adequate 
or complete cause of his actions (cf. E1Def7); 
the level of perfection is equated with the level 
of reality (cf. E2Def6) etc. All this makes Garrett 
to conclude: 
The ethical propositions of the Ethics 
themselves do not command, exhort, or 
entreat the reader. Rather, they evaluate, 
using four primary terms of positive 
4 Cf. GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical theory. In: 
GARRETT, Don (ed). The Cambridge Companion 
to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, pp. 285-297.
5 Cf. GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 285.
6 Cf. GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 286.
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ethical evaluation: ‘good’, ‘virtue’, ‘guided 
by reason’, and ‘free man’. As Spinoza 
uses these terms, each is, or can be, 
defined naturalistically – that is, in natural, 
descriptive, nonethical terms.7
This would mean that Spinoza’s ethical account 
fits within broader naturalistic context since 
ethical matter doesn’t differ essentially from 
study of nature.
 It is well known that Spinoza teaches 
that man’s so called “ends” are created by 
projection of some good on basis of actual man’s 
constitution or disposition. This attitude would 
today be termed as “emotivism” regarding the 
use of “good” and “bad”, and Garrett says that 
applications of these terms are neither true 
nor false, but rather are primarily expressions 
of desire, rather than, for example, 
descriptions of desires, or statements 
concerning objective features of the objects 
evaluated.8
 Then, prescriptiveness of basic ethical 
expressions seems to be – according to Garrett 
– relativized by their coextensiveness.9 Namely, 
Spinoza identifies, in some places, these 
expressions and so says: “To act in absolute 
conformity with virtue is nothing else in us but 
to act, to live, to preserve one’s own being… 
under the guidance of reason” (E4P24), and “to 
be guided by reason” is the same as “to be free” 
(cf. E4P66S). Aforementioned coextensiveness 
would allow us to pick up expression by which 
we shall denote some action, and this open up 
possibility for non-ethical interpretation of that 
action.
 Additional reason for descriptiveness of 
Spinoza’s ethics is Spinoza’s problematic account 
of “free” man10 insofar as he builds on that concept 
certain ethical maxims (for example: “the free 
man never acts deceitfully, but always with good 
faith”; E4P72). That is, when speaking about 
those maxims, Spinoza obviously calls for using 
our imagination because he refers to imagining 
completely ideal man whom we could imitate as 
“model of human nature”. Problem is in that that 
concept of perfectly free man is inconsistent in 
7 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 286.
8 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 287.
9 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., pp. 288-289.
10 Cf. GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., pp. 
288-290.
itself. Man, to be completely free, must act solely 
from his own nature, or he has to be complete 
cause of his actions which would be explained 
only by his nature. Spinoza, on the other side, 
explicitly says that it is impossible for man to be 
completely without influence of external things 
(cf. E4P4). These and similar considerations 
made Garrett to conclude: “description of a free 
man is to be understood as a description of the 
condition and behaviour human beings approach 
‘insofar as’ they are free”.11   
 Problematicity of Spinoza’s concept of 
“good” is also present in some specific situations 
when it is put together with freedom. Spinoza 
says that “good” is that what promotes a long 
life (cf. E4P39) and, on the other side, says that 
“the free man never acts deceitfully, but always 
with good faith” (E4P72). But what if we have to 
lie in order to save our lives? Therefore, “we are 
still obliged to recognize that, in Spinoza’s ethical 
theory, a good action can sometimes differ from 
the action of a free man”.12 This incongruence 
would show that “good” and “free man” are not 
so fixed and univocal terms as we are used to 
think and therefore cannot be interpreted in 
strictly prescriptive sense. 
 Garrett adduces interesting argument 
against prescriptiveness of Spinoza’s ethics 
referring to essential connection between 
representational and affective aspects of ideas.13 
These are two aspects of the same “mental 
events or entities”.14 In another words, the mere 
perceiving of some thing as useful functions 
as moving. Mind doesn’t consist of solely 
representational contents to which the tendency 
would be added. Garrett makes conclusion:
this inherent practicality of reason, in turn, 
explains how Spinoza can conceive of 
ethical knowledge as both naturalistic and 
intrinsically motivating. There is no need, 
and no purpose, for Spinoza to command, 
exhort, or entreat his readers – the reader’s 
own reason effectively does this for him.15
11 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 290. 
M. Kisner will say that „free“ man is thinkable only as 
thought experiment and as ethical model (cf. KISNER, 
Matthew. Spinoza on…, op. cit., pp. 175-177).
12 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 295.
13 Cf. GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., pp. 
296-297.
14 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 296.
15 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., pp. 296-297.
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The only thing that Spinoza had to do is to 
show to readers the consequences of their 
actions and since every person strives for self-
preservation “Ethics merely shows in what that 
self-preservation consists and what are the most 
effective means to it”.16 
 Main arguments that can be adduced for 
prescriptiveness of Spinoza’s ethics arise from 
the fact that man’s essence is, in its deepest core, 
specific expression of God’s essence, which is 
unlimited power. Man’s actual essence, expressed 
through his conatus perseverandi, manifests itself 
primarily in his power of acting.17 A man can 
realize his power of action or activity in different 
ways, depending whether he was successful in 
doing that or not. Will he be successful or not, it 
depends essentially on whether he tends toward 
true good or apparent good.
 If he tends to true good, he affirms his 
ontologically basic core of his being: power. 
Only then does he manifest greater similarity to 
God and, as for his practical and everyday life, 
he lives in more serene, peaceful, content way. 
Man tends toward true good if he lives under 
the guidance of reason, and it is exactly in this 
context that reason’s dictates have their value 
and role. They refer to this anthropological 
core common to all people and it is therefore 
understandable Spinoza’s trying to persuade his 
readers that it is in their interest to live under 
the guidance of reason. Since reason’s dictates 
refer to aforementioned anthropological 
core, Spinoza can develop his project of de-
subjectivization and universalization of “good”. 
Now we have no more descriptive approach 
according to which every man determines for 
himself what is good for him depending on 
actual constitution of body and mind or his 
affection but we have a move toward prescriptive 
16 GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s ethical…, op. cit., p. 297.
17 This basic anthropological fact is nicely summarized 
by Bartuschat: “Activity is the essential determining 
characteristic of man, because, and this stands in the 
background of all of Spinoza’s reflections, man (just as 
any other entity) is a modus of God, who is essentially 
power (1p34), so that man only brings the essence of 
God, power, to expression if he himself is essentially 
power and therein, as modified potentia Dei, essentially 
activity”. (BARTUSCHAT, Wolfgang. The Theory of the 
Good in Part 4 of the Ethics. In: HAMPE, M., RENZ. U. and 
SCHNEPF R. (eds), Spinoza’s Ethics. A Collective 
Commentary, Leiden: Brill, 2011, p. 239).
approach by which Spinoza wants to persuade 
reader that it is in his interest to follow the good 
he realized to be the true one. Here we can see 
the importance of adequate knowledge whereby 
reader of Spinoza’s philosophy can understand 
and accept the fact that it is truly in his interest 
to live guided by reason. He can understand and 
accept this fact only after having considered 
himself in context of the whole Nature. In 
such a frame we can see as justified Spinoza’s 
building his system starting from ontology and 
then, through anthropology and epistemology, 
arriving to correctly understood ethics. Because 
only starting from the doctrine of divine 
nature, which is power, and man’s reality as 
one of innumerous modes which expresses that 
nature, man can be aware of the fact in what 
consists his nature and that, respecting that 
fact, can correctly understand which one of 
different possible actualizations of his nature 
is the only one that is correct. Actualization of 
his nature on basis of inadequate knowledge 
and passion certainly is not the correct way of 
man’s persevering in being and increasing his 
power. Therefore, man becomes aware, through 
adequate knowledge of Nature and himself, of 
the fact that his actual and passive tendency for 
self-preservation and increasing activity doesn’t 
match with tendency that would truly realize his 
power, which is the core of his essence. Exactly 
“this difference nourishes the value judgement 
about human striving in the fourth part, which 
transcends its mere description”.18
 Therefore, we can say that Spinoza’s 
ethical project depends on whether his reader has 
understood and accepted his basic ontological 
and anthropological premises. If we realize 
that it is in our true interest to live according to 
reason’s dictates, then we should feel obligation 
to live that way. If we realize that we shall gain 
more activity, freedom, perfection and happiness 
if we live guided by reason, then we should 
feel obligation to live according to them and 
not according to our fortuitous tendencies. In 
the same manner, if we realize that it is in our 
interest to get as closer as possible to the model 
of human nature, then it can be expected that 
we act that way. That’s why B. Smith concludes: 
18 BARTUSCHAT, Wolfgang. The Theory…, op. cit., pp. 
240-241.
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The exemplar clearly serves a normative 
function, allowing us to judge the quality 
of our lives and identify the obstacles that 
stand in the way of achieving this ideal.19
 For the reason’s commandments it can be 
said that they present information of whether 
some good truly contribute to self-preservation 
and increasing of activity or not. However, such 
information are not, per se, value neutral because 
they manifest superiority when compared with 
those made on basis of subjectivist model of 
defining goods based on projection of apparent 
goods we are used to follow. By the way, 
speaking of true good implies privileged point 
of view from which we can talk about such a 
good.20 Spinoza expects from us to notice such 
a superiority: 
But Spinoza is concerned with information 
which he thinks must have the same effect 
on everyone who believes it, and that entitles 
him to call it ‘prescriptive’ in a fairly strong 
sense.21
 Such an information must have effect 
on man insofar as it manifests superiority in 
comparison to directions for behavior based on 
irrational tendency arisen from passion, and it 
must have the same effect on everyone because 
all men share basically the same essence. This 
essence also implies possibility of knowledge of 
true good in its comparative value.
 Prescriptiveness implied in reason’s 
dictates can be also shown by putting question 
to man who was acquainted with spinozism: 
“Do you really want to preserve your being 
and increase you power of action?” Since one 
can expect affirmative answer, then reason’s 
dictates cannot function as merely value neutral 
information or mere direction how to live that 
would be on the same level of importance like the 
direction arisen from inadequate knowledge and 
passive emotions. In that sense, reason’s dictates 
are hypothetical imperatives which, if better 
19 SMITH, Steven B. Spinoza’s Book of Life. 
Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, p. 135.
20 Cf. JARRETT, Charles. Spinoza on the Relativity of 
Good and Evil. In: KOISTINEN, O. and  BIRO J. (eds). 
Spinoza’s Metaphysical Themes. New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 161.
21 BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 307.
understood, show themselves to be categorical. 
That’s why E. Curley says:
His prescript ions are hypothetical 
imperatives with necessary antecedents, 
and so, in effect categorical. If you want 
‘to preserve your being’, strive to hate no 
one. Well, you do want to preserve your 
being, and it is not a contingent fact that 
you do. So the command is not in any way 
conditional.22
 However, a reason’s dictate cannot, as 
such, “redirect” man’s behavior in a way that he 
simply abandons his usual practice of indulging 
passive emotions. This dictate must be, by itself, 
an emotion that can prevail over passive emotion 
under condition to be stronger (cf. E4P7). When 
a man accepts and brings about what his reason 
requires from him, he begins to conceive that 
dictate not as some norm that would be external 
to actual realization of his conatus perseverandi.23 
In that sense, we could say that prescriptiveness 
should turn into factual realization of conatus 
perseverandi. Only then is resolved the problem 
of ontological dichotomy between “to be” and 
“should be”, or this thesis would be valid: “if his 
striving is led by reason, man reaches the goal” 
instead of thesis: “in order that man reaches his 
goal, which he does not necessarily reach by 
merely acting, he ought to use reason”.24
 I believe to have shown the main reasons 
for descriptiveness or prescriptiveness of Spinoza’s 
ethics. Although we can find, among scholars 
of Spinoza’s philosophy, a greater number of 
those who are proponents of prescriptiveness it 
doesn’t mean that arguments for descriptiveness 
are invalid or that prescriptiveness has 
advantage because we can probably find more 
scholars defending prescriptiveness instead of 
descriptiveness. To shed some additional light 
on this dilemma, it is useful to consider two 
additional arguments for prescriptiveness: the 
22 Quoted from: BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op.cit., 
p. 307. Among commentators who explicitly talk about 
prescriptiveness of Spinoza’s ethics, we can include M. Lin 
who, regarding some psychological principles promoted 
by Spinoza (E3P27C3; E3P28 and E4P46), concludes: 
„Psychological principles such as these form the heart of 
Spinoza’s moral psychology and normative ethics“ (LIN, 
Martin. Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza. In: The 
Philosophical Review. 115:3 (2006), p. 321.
23 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op.cit., p.246.
24 BARTUSCHAT, Wolfgang. The Theory…, op.cit., p. 244.
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first arises from Spinoza’s doctrine of ethical 
egoism; the second from his doctrine of mind’s 
eternity.
 But first it must be said that he was, of course, 
aware of the problem that prescriptiveness doesn’t 
fit, in principle, in his ontological-deterministic 
conception. According to this conception, man is 
not substance that could, in cases of being pulled 
in two or more different directions, freely choose 
what it should do instead of what it actually tends 
to. On ontological level, man is one expression 
of divine substance and he is, in every action, 
completely determined to do what he exactly has 
done, what he actually does or what will do. If 
he would be faced with requirement to do this 
and not that because his reason tells him that, he 
should have capability of making decision in view 
of true good and not apparent good he is used to 
follow. But freedom of choice can be proclaimed, 
in spinozism, only fiction based on man’s ignorance 
of the way in which he is determined. In another 
words, on ontological level, dichotomy between 
factual realization of conatus and realization that 
should be is forbidden. This realization always was, 
always is and always will be only one, according 
to implacable determinism that permeates every 
single part of reality, including man with his 
behavior.
 It doesn’t mean that man will not 
(sometimes, at least) act according to reason’s 
dictates although he is used to follow apparent 
good. However, even in these cases it is again at 
work the same determinism which makes man 
to act according to true good. If one stresses the 
consequentialist aspect of Spinoza’s ethics in a 
sense that suffice it to show the consequences of 
tending towards apparent or true good, it should 
be said again that not all men are determined to 
get in touch with Spinoza’s thinking and that not 
all of those who were lucky of getting acquainted 
with it are ready to accept his arguments and 
conclusions. For those who are determined in 
a way of having readiness to accept Spinoza’s 
thoughts it will be sufficient to expose the 
consequences to which lead tendency toward 
this or that good. But even in their cases it is not, 
ontologically speaking, about their capability of 
choosing true good. They are simply determined 
in a way that Spinoza’s thoughts are sufficiently 
convincing for them to do what Spinoza 
recommends. 
 Our philosopher knew that things 
worked, on ontological level, that way and that 
prescriptiveness didn’t fit within his system. 
However, he was not permitted to present things 
that way because he should have stated, in that 
case, this: “Situation, on ontological level, is such 
and such and reason’s dictates will follow only 
those who are predetermined from eternity to 
get acquainted with my philosophy and to have 
affinity with it”. This would be strictly elitist 
approach or elitist message that Spinoza couldn’t 
afford. Why? The answer lies first of all in his 
doctrine known as “ethical egoism”.
 No matter how aforementioned elitism 
was undeniable fact (“All things excellent are 
as difficult as they are”; E5P42S), it is also 
undeniable that all men have, in their nature, 
something in common which is, per se, the 
most precious element of man’s nature and 
which is in connection not only to “reason’s 
dictates” and “model of human nature” but to his 
whole philosophy: capability of understanding. 
That’s why Spinoza could rightly expect that 
all men were capable, potentially at least, of 
understanding and accepting his philosophy. 
Strictly elitist message would probably, from 
the very beginning, reject many people to study 
spinozism at all and would be additional motive 
and argument in hands of his opponents and 
enemies. 
 Then, explicit elitist message could have 
negative effects in society too. Namely, a man 
who lives under the guidance of reason is most 
useful to community because he contributes to 
its homogenization and harmonious coexistence. 
Many citizens, who are not prone to live according 
to reason’s dictates could easily, because of their 
infantile inertia,25 interpret them in a manner 
that they don’t feel or don’t see themselves 
predetermined in a sense of belonging to the 
elitist circle and that all what is left to them is to 
keep on trying to gain apparent and competitive 
goods. In another words, it was not in Spinoza’s 
interest to promote radically strict determinism 
when it is about man’s behavior because he could 
easily provoke resigned fatalism and passive 
25 By „infantile inertia“ I understand men’s proneness to 
live according to apparent goods, although in that case 
they are under strong influence of external causes like 
little child which depends completely on other men (cf. 
E5P39S).
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delivering to fate and own infantile inertia. 
Some sort of improvement, especially of greater 
number of persons, he could expect if he left 
some room for prescriptiveness and freedom 
(CC) although both of them imply contingency of 
things. But, on the other side, it is obviously that, 
when speaking of practical behavior, contingency 
is not only desirable but unavoidable:
we plainly have no knowledge as to the 
actual co-ordination and interconnection 
of things – that is, the way in which things 
are in actual fact ordered and connected – 
so that for practical purposes it is better, 
indeed, it is essential, to consider things as 
contingent (TTP, IV, p. 427)
 Besides, he was sticking to the rule:
To speak to the understanding of the 
multitude and to engage in all those activities 
that do not hinder the attainment of our aim. 
For we can gain no little advantage from the 
multitude, provided that we accommodate 
ourselves as far as possible to their level of 
understanding. Furthermore, in this way 
they will give a more favourable hearing to 
the truth (TIE, §17).
 Of course, it is possible to speak about 
prescriptiveness and freedom (CC) only on 
subjective-practical level: it is understandable 
for ordinary man to have freedom of choosing 
something that he is obliged, from inside or 
outside, to follow; or, he will easier improve 
himself if he has feeling to be able to choose what 
his reason dictates then if he has to recognize the 
fact that all what he can do is to get acquainted 
with Spinoza’s philosophy and eventually see 
whether he is determined in a way of having 
proneness to accept it and realize it in practical 
life. In that sense, Spinoza – faced with dilemma 
how to articulate his ethics: to develop objective-
ontological elitism based on descriptiveness 
and consequentialism or subjective-practical 
populism based on prescriptiveness – chooses the 
later option. The basic reason for such a choice 
is anthropological and ethical fact known as 
“egoism”.
 Spinoza teaches us that every thing 
tries to preserve in its being, but he also says 
that “Nobody endeavors to preserve his being 
for the sake of some other thing” (E4P25), 
which is a corner-stone of ethical egoism. If 
egoism is the basic law that every thing has 
to obey, then Spinoza himself had to obey it 
when developing his ethics. Let’s put simple 
question: was it in Spinoza’s interest that people 
understand “reason’s dictates” and “model of 
human nature” in mere descriptive sense or in 
some obligatory and prescriptive sense? If we 
take in consideration that prescriptiveness offers 
better chances for improving greater number of 
persons, then the answer is clear. If Spinoza had 
estimated that greater number of persons would 
have lived guided by reason in case of exposing 
his ethics in purely descriptive light, he wouldn’t 
have talked about reason’s “commandments” or 
“dictates” but about “recommendations” or, more 
precisely, about “messages” insofar as reason 
– in merely descriptive and consequentialist 
sense – only offer to reader useful information 
about consequences to which true goods lead. 
Such an approach would be compatible with 
strict determinism but it would be, on the other 
side, less effective in “waking” people from their 
infantile inertia and in motivating to action 
according to true goods as defined by Spinoza. 
So, why it was in Spinoza’s interest to achieve 
greater number of persons to accept his doctrine? 
To get some clearer answer, let us see some 
dramatic episodes of his life.
 Spinoza, thanks to his radical religious-
philosophical views, entered very early in conflict 
with Jewish community in Amsterdam. Spinoza’s 
views were unacceptable and scandalous 
for Jewish from Amsterdam and he was 
excommunicated in age of 24 years. He was 
excommunicated by the greatest possible 
anathema. There were many who hated him 
and, allegedly, one radical Jewish even tried to 
kill him. There were many consequences of such 
an excommunication: other Jewish were not 
allowed to communicate with him; to welcome 
him in their house or to help him in some other 
way; to read anything written by him etc. Very 
soon, he was even expelled from Amsterdam.
Since he wanted to help people in their 
liberation from superstitions, prejudices and 
fears, and since he wanted to assure freedom of 
philosophy from theology and generally freedom 
of thinking and expressing in public place, he 
published, anonymously, his Theological-Political 
Treatise in 1670. However, reactions were much 
more unfavourable than he expected. Not only 
that theological influence was not diminished but 
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so desired freedom of thinking and expressing 
didn’t increase. He only additionally fostered 
hatred against himself.
 It is well known tragic episode with 
Spinoza’s political protector Jan de Witt. He was 
regent of Netherland, with liberal worldview 
and, as such, meritorious for possibility that 
progressive book, like Spinoza’s one, could be 
published at all. On the other side, such a book 
was a thorn in flesh to many influent orthodox 
Calvinists and church people. The mob was 
incited against De Witt and he was murdered in 
1672. This incident made Spinoza so angry that 
he wanted to get out on public place and hung 
inscription against the mob: Ultimi barbarorum. 
Spinoza was dreaming about more tolerant and 
rational society where he could develop his 
philosophy without disturbance and fear.
 Spinoza adduced, in his Ethics, many 
reasons why people should choose true good 
in sense how he describes it. This true good 
had to be presented in prescriptive light 
so that people would indeed choose it. In 
this manner, Spinoza could expect that his 
philosophy would have bigger effect than if he 
presented his doctrine descriptively, in sense of 
ontological-objective elitism. Namely, Spinoza 
was not surrounded by rational men ready 
for non-partial evaluating arguments pro et 
contra but with uneducated mob subjected to 
passive emotions, inadequate knowledge and 
prejudices. However, greater “rationality” didn’t 
show either many philosophers and theologians 
who addressed to him severe criticism and 
accusations inciting mob against him. So, 
Spinoza could expect greater success of his 
enterprise if he adjusted himself to that mob 
(but to many educated persons as well). For 
this mob, it is understood that man has freedom 
to choose what has known as something that 
should be done: to ordinary man, concept of 
freedom (CC) and prescriptiveness is something 
completely understandable. That means that it 
was in Spinoza’s interest to leave some room 
for prescriptiveness and freedom (CC).
 If people accepted Spinoza’s arguments 
and conclusions explicated in Theological-
Political Treatise, he would have had advantage 
in sense of greater freedom for developing, 
communicating and possibly correcting his 
thoughts. In that sense, we can say that he 
would have had “minimal” advantage insofar 
as he wouldn’t be disturbed in his developing of 
philosophy. If this basic condition was fulfilled, 
he would certainly have published, in his life, 
his main work where he exposed directions 
which could motivate other people to get 
closer to model he talked about. If Spinoza’s 
contemporaries notably approached to model 
of human nature, they could have served as 
example for Spinoza and additional motivation 
for his approaching to that model. In that sense, 
we can talk about “maximal” advantage Spinoza 
would have had if people accepted and lived 
his doctrine to greater extent. I repeat the basic 
point: Spinoza could count on greater efficacy of 
his messages if he presented them in prescriptive 
sense regardless of the fact that prescriptiveness 
is actually incompatible with the rest of his 
philosophy. In the same manner, he could count 
on people’s feeling to be free (CC) to choose 
what they are persuaded to be more useful to 
them. In that manner, he could incite readers in 
easier way to act according to his suggestions no 
matter of how much their feeling to be free (CC) 
was fiction. To conclude: he had strong reasons 
for descriptiveness but even stronger reasons for 
prescriptiveness insofar as it was in his interest to 
persuade as many people as possible to embrace 
ethical life proposed by him. 
 Another important reason for Spinoza to 
permit prescriptiveness arises from his doctrine 
of mind’s “eternity”. Namely, he practically 
demotivated, with this doctrine, people to strive 
for true goods. What was the problem? Doesn’t 
“mind’s eternity” mean the same as “soul’s 
immortality” in religious sense?
 Spinoza talks very critically and ironically 
about mob’s belief that it will be, after death, 
rewarded for good deeds and punished for 
bad deeds (cf. E5P41S). This belief essentially 
depends on belief that man’s soul exists even 
after death and that man should foster the feeling 
of duty and piety in order to be able to fulfill 
God’s commandments and gain the heaven: 
And if men did not have this hope and this 
fear, and if they believed on the contrary 
that minds perish with bodies and that they, 
miserable creatures, worn out by the burden 
of piety, had no prospect of future existence, 
they would return to their own inclinations 
54
FRIDL, Miroslav. Spinoza’S dual View on human Freedom. p. 41-58
Revista Conatus - FilosoFia de spinoza - volume 10 - númeRo 19 - Julho 2018
and decide to shape their lives according to 
their lusts, and to be ruled by fortune rather 
than by themselves (E5P41S).
 According to Spinoza, virtue has its value 
and importance in this life, that is: it is not 
“burden” which people must carry or pay out in 
this life in order to earn eternal blessedness in 
afterlife. For Spinoza, blessedness is not some 
goal achieved by living virtuously: “Blessedness 
is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself” 
(E5P42). If “mind’s eternity” is not the same as 
“soul’s immortality”, then the question remains 
how to understand it. 
 Things get clearer when we see that 
Spinoza conceive things under two perspectives: 
under perspective of their atemporal or eternal 
essence and under perspective of this essence’s 
actual realization: “Nevertheless, there is 
necessarily in God an idea which expresses the 
essence of this or that human body under a form 
of eternity” (E5P22). Body’s essence, in a state 
of its spatial-temporal actualization, also has it 
correlate under attribute of thought: a concrete 
mind which is idea of this body. On basis of 
Spinoza’s parallelism, mind passes, in a deep 
ontological sense, the same fortune of its body; it, 
as idea of its body, is born and perishes together 
with its body. When body dies, body’s eternal 
essence remains together with its atemporal 
idea contained in divine intellect. Therefore, 
the essence of body can be conceived under 
the perspective of eternity or temporality; the 
essence of mind too (cf. E5P23Dm and S). From 
Spinoza’s philosophy there follows temporal and 
atemporal existence of mind and body.
 Mind’s “eternity” refers to set of adequate 
knowledges or ideas that mind has when 
conceiving its body under the perspective of 
eternity (cf. E5P31Dm). All these adequate ideas 
make up eternal divine intellect (cf. E5P40S). 
Therefore, mind’s “eternity” does not refer to 
man’s person, self-consciousness or selfhood 
and can’t be understood as immortality of soul. 
In another words, human mind – after death – 
doesn’t survive its body. What are implications of 
such a doctrine on the ethical prescriptiveness?
 It, objectively speaking, makes the speech 
about prescriptiveness – within spinozism – more 
urgent. Namely, every reason’s commandment 
shows the consequences to which a good action 
leads. No matter of how much such an information 
be true (in sense that it helps man in achieving 
his true happiness), it can not move man to 
action unless it is emotion. However, ordinary 
reader who realizes that acting according to 
reason will not affect his condition after death 
(because mind does not survive the body) can 
easily find excuses for indulging his infantile 
inertia instead of acting guided by reason. 
Namely, he does not act like some machine 
without flash and blood equally prone for true 
or apparent goods. He is used to act according 
to his infantile inertia and acting according to 
reason’s commandments requires, on the other 
side, self-denial and unpleasant discipline. So it 
is easy to imagine situation in which an ordinary 
man will think this why: Why would I struggle 
to live guided by reason if my behavior does not 
affect my next life? Then, even if Spinoza says 
that living by reason leads to true happiness in 
this life, why would I trust him? And, even if he 
is right, who can guarantee that I shall achieve 
such a condition especially if it takes many years 
of unpleasant self-denial? What if I try hard to 
follow his suggestions and die before achieving 
the desirable condition? Since Spinoza’s doctrine 
of mind’s “eternity” can easily demotivate man 
in his following true goods, Spinoza had to insist 
on some kind of prescriptiveness so that he could 
count on some kind of improvement of greater 
part of his readers. Much efficacious approach 
to such a problem had Platone, who taught – in 
his Phaedon – that the way of ethical behavior in 
this life will certainly affect man’s condition in 
afterlife. The immortality of soul is the strongest 
and implacable mechanism which provides 
just punishment or reward for deeds in this 
life. It means that bad men will not avoid their 
punishment in afterlife (cf. Phaed 107c5-d2). So, 
the soul’s immortality is the reason number one 
why man should live by virtue (and knowledge) 
in this life.
 This lack of motivation for living according 
to reason can be recompensed, at least partly, by 
prescriptively (and not descriptively) presented 
ethics, especially if Spinoza’s readers take 
concept of prescriptiveness and freedom (CC) 
for granted. It seems that prescriptiveness is 
unavoidable means for reaching such a sublime 
ethical habitus which makes it possible man’s 
following reason’s dictates as something natural 
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and not as “obligation” and in which there 
vanishes difference between prescriptiveness and 
descriptiveness. So we can conclude: Spinoza 
had good reasons for descriptiveness but even 
stronger reasons for prescriptiveness insofar as 
it is about efficaciousness of his ethics (and not, 
first of all, about compatibility of his ethics with 
ontology and anthropology).
3) SpInoza’S unoffIcIal concept of freedom
 We can see, from afore said, that ethical 
prescriptiveness is certainly present in Spinoza’s 
ethical project. Of course, this prescriptiveness 
is not explicit, but it is present anyway. It is not 
of great importance whether we’ll call it “soft”, 
“implicit” or “moderate”, but it is important that 
Spinoza in some way promoted it, counted on it 
and that it can influence man’s behavior.
 Insofar as a man initially perceives and 
conceives true good not like neutral being which 
can equally easily follow apparent or true goods, 
he has to make effort and “choose” to follow 
true goods after realizing that he will have more 
advantage if acting that way although it requires 
self-denial (this “self-denial” is, of course, actually 
self-affirmation or leads to self-affirmation because 
man, when guided by reason, actually affirms his 
essence, but it inevitably appears as self-denial 
to all those who have to abandon their pleasant 
and infantile habits). In that way, we have basic 
precondition for acting freely (CC). In another 
words, the fact that man, at least sometimes, sets 
apart for true goods although he has habit to act 
by his infantile inertia, shows that he functions 
like thing that, in principle, can take destiny in 
his hands and direct  his action toward good that 
is truly useful to him.
 Spinoza spoke of many free man’s 
advantages, but he spoke of “free” man as a 
“goal” that all should approach as much as 
possible in order to be more active and perfect. 
It is supposed that man, in achieving that goal, 
can set apart for this goal no matter of how much 
it is difficult to redirect one’s own life. To put it 
in another way, man – in order to achieve that 
goal – has to set apart for true goods in his life 
many times because his infantile inertia does not 
allow him to resolve this dilemma once for all. 
Man begins his life odyssey by being completely 
passive, that is, by being completely exposed to 
external things and depending on them. This 
manner of actualization of proper conatus is later, 
by inertia, additionally confirmed and rooted if 
man – by following apparent goods – develops 
habits of exposing and connecting himself to 
unstable and limited external goods. But Spinoza 
teaches us that this way of self-preservation and 
increasing of power isn’t good and that man 
should choose another way. In another words, 
he calls man to set apart for true goods and get 
closer to model of human nature. He practically 
sends a message: You should set apart for true 
good because it is truly useful for you, and you 
can do it! 
 But what about determinism as one of 
basic constituents of his system? How can we 
make compatible that man’s “capability” of 
choosing true good although being prone to 
choose apparent good with doctrine that man is, 
in his every act, determined by God and not by 
himself (cf. E1P26)? Or how can we insert man’s 
“capability” to set apart for this or that good in 
overall causal network in which every thing is, 
in its existing and acting, determined by another 
thing (cf. E1P28 and P33)?
 Next answer seems to be the only one that 
satisfies: we must approach this problem from 
objective-ontological and subjective-practical 
perspective or level. On the first level, man has no 
capability of setting apart for something instead 
of something else. However he, on subjective-
practical level, seems to set apart for something. 
Even more, he is urged – if he realized what was 
truly useful for him although he still has tendency 
to act according to his infantile inertia – to choose. 
How is it possible? It is possible because man does 
not (and can not) know in which way he is, on 
objective-ontological level, determined; that is, he 
does not know whether he is determined to act 
this or that way. On the other side, he is pushed 
to act somehow because doing nothing is not the 
best way of realizing his conatus and increasing 
his power of action. All what he is aware of is 
coexistence, in him, different tendencies every 
one of which offers its reasons why to be preferred 
instead of the other one: tendency to apparent 
goods offers comfortable life according to infantile 
inertia and tendency to true goods offers a higher 
level of freedom/activity/perfection/happiness. It 
is also possible because man feels himself to be 
some sort of substance and source of his actions.
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 Dual view on human being (on objective-
ontological and subjective-practical level) refers 
in no way only to human freedom. It refers to 
much more important and ontologically deeper 
aspect of human behavior: activity. We must 
notice one important thing: Spinoza promotes 
greater man’s activity in every field he was 
employed with. Let’s see some examples.
 As far as ethics concerns, Spinoza defines 
basic ethical categories under the aspect of 
activity: “we call good or evil that which is the 
cause of pleasure or pain…, that is…, which 
increases or diminishes, assists or checks our 
power of activity” (E4P29Dm). In another place, 
he says: “the emotion of pain is… the act of 
transition to a state of less perfection; that is, 
the actuality whereby a man’s power of activity 
is diminished or checked” (E3DA3E). Apparent 
goods are not true goods because we are, in 
that case, exposed to the unpredictable changes 
of things on which our happiness depend (cf. 
E5P20S). Even more, Spinoza severely criticizes 
men who tend toward apparent goods: “avarice, 
ambition, lust, etc. are kinds of madness, 
although they are not accounted as diseases” 
(E4P44S). True goods bring man to what 
is really useful to him; that is, they bring to 
increasing of his perfection and power of action 
(cf. E4P18S).
 Activity is essential moment of freedom 
because freedom means acting from own nature 
(cf. E1Def7), in which case man is active. He is 
passive if his actions are caused and explained 
by external things. In order to achieve greater 
level of freedom, man has, on his disposition, 
knowledge which helps him in moderating his 
passions through which he is addicted to external 
things and depends on them. Knowledge, on the 
other side, is itself emotion or incites emotion 
and emotions are those that determine man to 
specific action. 
 Virtue is ethical category in which it is 
even more evident the role of activity in Spinoza’s 
ethics: 
By virtue and power I mean the same thing; 
that is…, virtue, insofar as it is related 
to man, is man’s very essence, or nature, 
insofar as he has power to bring about that 
which can be understood solely through the 
laws of his own nature (E4Def8). 
It is important to actualize proper conatus in a 
way of as great as possible independence from 
external things. This is the only way of achieving 
own activity. The value and importance of acts 
that are brought about only by proper nature 
is in fact that they surely bring to man’s self-
preservation (cf. E3P9S). In another words, 
the more man’s acts depend on external causes 
the more questionable is his self-preservation 
(cf. E4P37S1). Therefore, man is safest in his 
self-preservation when he acts solely from 
his nature because there can not exist in it 
contradictory or auto-destructive elements (cf. 
E3P4 and P5). When we act following solely the 
laws of our own nature, we certainly do what 
is useful for us, that is, we manifest activity or 
virtue. Virtue is not some label that we put on 
people from outside according to their actions 
which we find ethically worthy, but is “power 
of each individual to actualize its essence”.26 
We actualize our essence only when we act by 
commandments of reason which order only 
what is truly useful for us.
 As far as epistemology concerns, Spinoza 
teaches that, in the first or the lowest level of 
knowledge, man has inadequate knowledges 
because he achieves them through permanently 
changeable, fortuitous and subjective affections 
of own body (cf. E2P35S). Adequate knowledges 
man has in cases of the second and third kind of 
knowledge. Second kind of knowledge is based 
on what is common to all things (cf. E2P37 
and P38C). In that case, he does not depend so 
much on changeable external things but takes in 
account unchangeable elements of reality. In the 
third kind of knowledge, or intuitive knowledge, 
which consists in knowing the innermost essence 
(cf. TIE, §95), man achieves even higher level 
of activity and perfection. Spinoza says that the 
greatest pleasure man can have in
contemplation of himself and his power 
of activity… Now man’s true power of 
activity, or his virtue, is reason itself…, with 
which man regards clearly and distinctly… 
Therefore self-contentment arises from 
reason. Again, in contemplating himself a 
man perceives clearly and distinctly, that 
is, adequately, only what  follows from his 
power of activity (E4P52Dm).
26 LORD, Beth. Spinoza’s Ethics. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p.108.
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 As far as political level concerns, Spinoza is 
proponent of democracy as an ideal organization 
of society. In such an organization, man 
approaches closest to the power of action which 
he had in natural state. Advantage of democracy, 
in comparison to monarchy and aristocracy is in 
fact that man can be more active because he can 
be elected to govern, together with others, the 
state or he has right to elect his representative.
 Therefore, Spinoza sends to his readers 
clear message: You are active but you can (and 
should) be even more active! Nice! However, 
what does it mean that man has activity in context 
of substance monism and strict determinism? 
Namely, in context of substance monism and 
determinism the existence and action of every 
thing or mode depends essentially on God’s 
essence or power:
Whatever exists expresses God’s nature 
or essence in a definite and determinate 
way…; that is…, whatever exists expresses 
God’s power, which is the cause of all things, 
in a definite and determinate way, and so… 
some effect must follow from it (E1P36Dm)
 Man is expression of God’s essence or 
power, and God’s essence doesn’t consist only 
in necessary existence but in necessary acting 
too (cf. E1P20 and P36). Man, with his actual 
essence, exemplifies, concretizes, or expresses 
God’s power. In that sense, we can say that 
man is, speaking of his actions, specific medium 
through which God’s power or infinite activity 
is expressed:
Finite individuals can be conceived  as 
specifically determined centers of causal 
activity and power, individual essences 
operating as modifiers determining the way 
in which substance and its efficacy or total 
power is distributed27   
In other words, man is one of specific media 
through which God’s power is expressed in a 
27 VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics of 
Being. The Concept of Power and its Role in 
Spinoza’s Metaphysics. Turku: Painosalama Oy, 
2007, p.105. Although Viljanen uses term „center“, I 
prefer term „medium“ because „center“ could eventually 
insinuate its reading in the sense of the „source“ of 
man’s activity while this possibility is excluded if we talk 
about man as „medium“ through which God’s power is 
expressed. In other words, man’s basic passivity or lack of 
activity is better expressed – I think – by term „medium“. 
concrete way. He, as such – or, if we conceive 
things on objective-ontological level – has no 
(and can not have) in himself the source of his 
activity (because he is not substance) but is, in 
his existence and acting, determined completely 
from outside: from God. Therefore, man is not 
active on that basic, objective-ontological, level 
although he can, on subjective-practical level, 
feel and conceive himself as an active substance.28
 Spinoza counts on this dichotomy and 
applies it implicitly when speaking of man’s 
activity and his freedom. Although he conceives 
man and other modes as expressions of God’s 
essence, he treats man implicitly as “quasi-
substance”29 which has in itself the source of 
its activity and which can choose this or that 
direction of acting. However, like man can be 
– on objective-ontological level – only pseudo-
substance in the same way he can only be 
pseudo-active. All the activity or power of actions 
belongs solely to God.
Summary
We could see that Spinoza put some goals 
or ideals that man could and should realize in 
order to affirm his essence as more efficaciously 
as possible, or in order to preserve in his being 
and increase his power of acting as efficaciously 
as possible. Because of his infantile inertia, man 
can more easily chase apparent goods instead 
of accepting and living true goods although the 
second option is better not only for him but for 
the other people as well. 
 Spinoza tries to assure reader that it is 
good, first of all for him, to follow what is truly 
useful to him. Doing that, Spinoza puts aside the 
basic ontological premises according to which 
man is neither substance; nor he has the source 
of his activity in himself; nor he has capability 
of choosing this or that. However, it seems that 
Spinoza didn’t have alternative choice but to 
allow, implicitly and on subjective-practical 
level, possibility of man’s actively acting in a 
sense of choosing by himself, almost as being 
substance, this or that good. It seems that it was 
28 Cf. DELEUZE, Gilles. Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza. New York: Zone Books, 1990, p.306.
29 Cf. GARRETT, Don. Spinoza’s Conatus Argument. 
In: KOISTINEN O. and BIRO J. (eds). Spinoza. 
Metaphysical themes, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p.150.
58
FRIDL, Miroslav. Spinoza’S dual View on human Freedom. p. 41-58
Revista Conatus - FilosoFia de spinoza - volume 10 - númeRo 19 - Julho 2018
important to him not to stress the difference 
between objective-ontological and subjective-
practical level because he wanted to achieve 
his goal: intellectual and ethical improvement 
of men. In that way it happens that freedom 
becomes, in Spinoza’s system, the goal which 
man can gradually achieve by applying freedom 
in traditional sense of capability of choice. So 
we can speak of two concepts of freedom in 
spinozism: official and unofficial.  
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